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Abstract:  Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their 
voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot, 
because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access 
to them. Enactive theories still have no idea, because they have so far mainly focused on perception 
of our physical world. We surmise, however, that they hold promise since, in trying to understand 
cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cogniser with his world. 
In  this  paper  we attempt  an answer for  the  question  What  is  social  perception  in  an enactive  
account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action (perception is 
action and action is perception),  an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities or 
contingencies that characterise a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be 
social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what 
social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which the social 
skills structure – both constrain and empower – social interaction. Some of the implications of our 
account  for how social  and physical  perception  differ,  the importance of embodiment  in social 
interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also 
addressed.
Keywords:  social  perception,  intersubjectivity,  enaction,  skill,  participatory  sense-making, 
embodiment, self, cultural psychology
Introduction
The well-known traditional approaches to social cognition, theory of mind and simulation theory, 
have been extensively criticized in the last few years. Criticisms of these mainstream approaches 
include that they are overly cognitivist and individualist (Hutto 2004), i.e. that there is a lack of 
attention to the embodiment of social agents (Gallagher 2001; Stawarska 2006), a neglect of the 
interaction process (Gallagher and Hutto 2008; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; 2008; De Jaegher 
2009), that they are based on a stage-conception of development, which is more simplistic and less 
plausible than a process-conception, (Hendriks-Jansen 1997), and that the experience of engaging 
with others is ignored in it (Hobson 2002; Thompson 2001). Steps are being taken in alternative 
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directions and the present paper situates itself within the realm of these contenders. Specifically, we 
take an  enactive route  to answering the question of the role  and nature of perception in  social 
understanding. 
Why this approach? Enaction as a general approach to cognition, and as characterized by Varela, 
Thompson and others, focuses particularly on a set of elements that we think are also pertinent to 
understanding  social engagements  (see  also  Thompson  2001).  These  elements  are:  autonomy, 
sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience (Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher in press). 
In putting forward these 5 themes as the basic concepts for an account of cognition, this program 
sets itself  apart from more loosely described 'embodiment'  theories.  More so than the latter  the 
enactive  approach,  while  also  taking  embodiment  as  one  of  its  basic  axioms,  pays  particular 
attention to the interaction between the cognizer and her world. This is especially relevant to an 
investigation in the realm of the social, as we will see.1 
Accounts  of  cognition  that  call  themselves  enactive  do  not  necessarily  share  all  of  their 
assumptions. Differences based on respective basic premises can be delineated (Torrance 2005), in 
particular between the life-mind-continuity brand of enaction (e.g. Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
1991,  Thompson  2007)  and  the  dynamic  sensorimotor  account  of  perceptual  consciousness 
(O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; Noë and Hurley 2003). The former is characterized by the five 
themes mentioned in the paragraph above. It aims to provide a story of what the mind is and holds 
that the biological organization and experience of the agent are central to his cognitive capacities. 
Another way to put this is that,  for this school, "living is itself a cognitive process – a process 
whereby a living being creates and maintains its own domain of meaningfulness, in generating and 
maintaining  its  own  self-identity  as  an  embodied  organism"  (Torrance  2005,  p.  359).  The 
sensorimotor  account,  on  the  other  hand,  claims  that  perceptual  consciousness  consists  in  the 
exercise of knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies. That is, perception is a matter of exploring 
the environment in an active, engaged way, a process in which the embodiment of the cogniser and 
specifics of the environment play a crucial role. Perceiving, on this account, consists in exercising a 
set of sensorimotor skills. Another important difference between the two stories is that the latter is 
not concerned with developing an elaborated account of who the subject is, whereas for the former, 
answering this question is paramount for understanding cognition. 
Despite their differences, these programs share important characteristics as well: first, in the way 
they attempt to understand cognition they distance themselves from classical cognitivist discourse, 
for which cognition is the representation of the 'outside world'  and the internal manipulation of 
1  Even approaches that stress the interactive and embodied nature of social cognition (e.g. Gallagher 2004; 2008) are 
in need of further elaboration, specifically with regard to the precise role of interacting in intersubjectivity (De 
Jaegher 2009). The present paper is also in part motivated by these discussions.
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these representations, and second, they adhere to the idea that meaning is created in an 'active', 
embodied-embedded engagement with the world in terms of value and meaning, or sense-making in 
short. In the present paper, we aim to bring together aspects of both lines of thought in order to 
explicate what social perception is on an enactive view. 
The paper has three main elements. Beginning with a brief overview of the principal elements of an 
enactive approach, we outline as simply as possible the major tenets of the perspective which will 
have an impact on how we consider social perception, social skills, and the self that deploys them. 
Following that basic outline we examine the basic concepts of an enactivist account of the social – 
describing  both  the  participatory,  shared  (rather  than  observatory  and  inferred)  character  of 
intersubjectivity, along with a detailed exploration of the idea of social perception, and how it might 
relate to the idea of perception as mastery of contingencies. In the final section of the paper then, we 
examine some of the implications of this enactive account of the social for our understanding of the 
self and embodiment, and identify a key domain of research – cultural psychology – where much 
enactive  thinking  is  already  extant,  and  which  may  provide  a  rich  and  fruitful  source  of 
understanding for enactive social interaction.
Enactive Perception
The enactive approach focuses on the interaction between an autonomous agent and its environment 
(Varela, 1997; Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007). Cognition, perception and action are three facets 
of the general process of sense-making, an agent adaptively coping with the challenges of embodied 
existence. In order to make clear the continuity of form between individual cognition and social 
perception it will help us to explicate some of the principles of the enactive approach and to outline 
the way in which the basic concepts of autonomy, identity and embodiment give us an account of 
perspective and meaning making – how they give us an enactive account of perception and action.
Autonomy and naturalistic value
It all begins in autonomy.  Recently,  Thompson & Stapleton (2009) have examined the basis of 
enactive thinking in the concept of autonomy. Attempting to capture the principles of autonomy 
worked out by Varela (1979, see also 1997) they claim (2009, p. 24) that an autonomous system has 
the following three key characteristics: The constituent processes of the system must 
(1) recursively depend on each other for their generation and realisation as a network,
(2) constitute the system as a unity in whatever domain they exist and 
(3) determine the domain of possible interactions with the environment.
Autonomous systems are not organised or maintained by processes outside of the system, they are 
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not tended by either  a maker  or a set  of support  services.  In identifying  the set  of causes that 
produces any of the component processes of the system, you will always make reference to some 
other component process of the system.
Autonomy,  vitally,  does not  mean that  the system is  causally  closed (Varela,  1979).  Quite  the 
reverse. Your body, for example, is an autonomous system, and it only manages to maintain itself 
by drawing in many things from outside of it (water, air, nutrients, energy) and churning them up to 
continually produce itself. Autonomous systems are always running to stand still, as it were. But 
those elements brought into the system are drawn in by the processes of the system itself and their 
impact on the system is determined by the operation of those processes. Though the system is open 
to the world (and embedded in it), it governs its own behaviour. It is the organisation of the system 
itself that structures and constrains the manner in which interaction with the world occurs – which 
substances can be drawn into the processes of the system itself, how different perturbations affect 
its activity, and so forth. Its state at any given time is determined by the system's own activity rather 
than being set by the world around it in the way a computer is programmed or controlled by key 
presses.  An  autonomous  system  is,  then,  always  in  the  process  of  producing  itself,  and  will 
continually digest the various materials required for that in its environment. 
The  enactive  approach  sees  in  autonomous  organisation  the  foundation  for  naturally  occurring 
values (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009; Di Paolo, 2005; Weber & Varela, 2002). Any autonomous 
system  will  require  certain  criteria  to  be  continually  met  if  it  is  to  continue  existing.  If  the 
organisation  of  processes  is  disrupted  or  the  necessary  raw  materials  unavailable  then  the 
autonomous system ceases to be. At first glance it looks like an autonomous system values its own 
conditions of continuity in about the same way that a falling rock values gravity, but there are a few 
key facts that must be borne in mind when describing autonomy as the naturalistic basis for value.
Firstly, the system produces the need in the very same processes as it produces itself. The details of 
a system's organisation and component materials (what we will discuss in a moment as the system's 
embodiment) simultaneously determine the identity of the system and the conditions that the system 
must  maintain  to  continually  produce  itself.  The  conditions  of  continuity  (or  viability)  are 
determined by the organisation, not by the recognition of them by some outside observer, nor by 
attribution.
Secondly, the system's organisation is not a brief occurrence fortuitously and evanescently produced 
by the chaotic roiling of a dynamic world, like a face in the clouds. Once formed it holds itself 
together  not  because  of  chance  but  because  keeping  its  organisation  is  precisely  what  the 
organisation of the network does.
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Embodiment, adaptivity and life on the edge
Now, autonomy is important, but it does not yet get us all that we want. We might have a basis for 
an intrinsic value to a given system, but with that alone there are only two ways in which the system 
in question can appreciate the state of its values – by continuing to exist or by disintegrating. Such a 
limited set of possibilities does not do justice to the complexity of meaning and experience that we 
consider a typical cognitive agent to enjoy. To address this issue we can examine in a little more 
detail a further key ingredient to an enactive account of mind.
Di Paolo (2005) examines the considerations arising from the fact that “bare” autonomy does not 
give us much to work with in terms of value. Specifically, Di Paolo argues that if a system is to be 
considered genuinely capable of appreciating the state of its values then it must have some adaptive 
capacity.  Adaptivity  is  defined  in  this  context  as  a  system's  capacity  to  distinguish  between 
activities that will drive it toward or away from disintegration and to favour the latter. The specific 
forms  of  adaptivity  evidenced  by  the  system  will  depend  on  its  physical  instantiation  –  its 
embodiment – as will the particular range of sensitivities and possible actions.
With the recognition of adaptivity as essential for the system's appreciation of its current state we 
have all of the components for an enactive description of agency, meaning and mind. Rather than 
just maintaining itself or disintegrating, we have the resources to describe ill-health and well-being, 
the  dynamic  trajectory  of  a  system  whose  state  is  improving  or  disimproving,  stressed  or 
comfortable.
The autonomy of the system creates the values of the system just as it creates the system itself 
continuously. Any such entity whose behaviour is variable, flexible in a manner that allows it to 
better maintain itself over time is not just a dynamic system but an agent – a system with intrinsic 
values  whose  behaviours  are  governed  by  those  values  rather  than  being  dictated  by  the 
environment.
Within an enactive framework cognition – rather than being something that you carry with you in 
your skull and feed with information – is the entire on-going relationship between an agent and its 
environment in which its  values are adaptively maintained.  Enactivists  call  this process “sense-
making”  (see Di Paolo,  De Jaegher  & Rohde,  in  press,  also Thompson & Stapleton,  2009; De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). Sense-making is the autonomous organism’s interaction with the world 
in terms of meaning and value. Because the organism is its own identity-generator (see below), its 
interactions with the environment have a direction: that of its continued existence, the maintenance 
of its identity. The organism regulates its couplings with the world on the basis of this, and thus 
some aspects of that world have meaning and value for it, and others do not. 
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The point being made in using the term sense-making rather than a more neutral phrase such as 
“adaptive behaviour” is to make clear that the process is not a neutral or abstract one. The activities 
of the agent  are arranged the way they are because the agent's  values (grounded in its identity 
formation and maintenance) give meaning to events, to actions, to outcomes. What is a tangle of 
physical and chemical dynamics becomes a tangle of valued implications for the agent’s identity.
Because of its adaptivity and its autonomy the agent makes meaning in its interactions with its 
environment.  As  mentioned  above,  this  is  not  attributed  meaning,  not  a  characteristic  of  our 
observations of the agent, but is meaning for the agent itself, intrinsic to it and independent of us. 
The mind is not, in this view, something compartmentalised from or above the on-going processes 
of living. There is a genuine continuity between life and mind (Jonas, 1966; Thompson, 2007). The 
biological autonomy and needs of a living embodied agent are precisely what provide the ground 
for the creation of mind and meaning in the agent's interactions. The meanings are for the agent, 
experienced by the agent, precisely because the value of those experiences is their value for the 
agent. 
The fact that the system is open to the world both in terms of digesting the energy and materials 
used in its continued self-maintenance, and also in terms of being (obviously) subject to impacts 
and  perturbations  from outside  of  itself  means  that  it  is  sensitive  to  its  environment.  But  the 
particular aspects of its environment to which it is sensitive depend on the nature of the system 
itself. Many (if not most) events in its environment will have no real bearing on what the system 
does.  The  kinds  of  events  and  perturbations  that  have  any  significance  for  the  system  are 
determined by the structure and operation of the system itself – only those events that have some 
bearing on its values can become entangled with the system's own activities. The world with which 
the system interacts  is  therefore  partly  determined  by the system itself.  This  is  the  concept  of 
“reciprocal determinism” or “reciprocal causation” often referred to in the enactive literature, the 
basis of what Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) call the “fundamental circularity”, and which is 
drawn from the work of Merleau-Ponty: “The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a 
subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, 
but from a world which the subject itself projects” (1962, p. 430).
The system reacts to (and thereby imbues with meaning) those events in its environment to which it 
is sensitive by virtue of the fact that those events affect its values, its activities. Meaning arises in a 
relationship of implicature, ramification and consequence for the values of an autonomous system 
(McGann 2007).
When all needs are met and values unthreatened the world is simple and safe. When we are driven 
to the very edge of death or disintegration the world is rich and dangerous. Most experiences are a 
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ranging trajectory between these two extremes though we might spend a little more time in the rich 
and dangerous end of things – an autonomous system has to run to stand still after all, and the world 
cannot be relied upon to maintain it.  An agent, therefore, is never unconcerned, never neutrally 
involved with its environment. The relationship is always loaded or skewed, perspectival rather than 
objective or abstract. The enactive approach must provide a clear account of perspective if we are to 
provide a general account of perception, social or otherwise.
Enactive points of view
Of most of what is going on around an agent at any given time, the agent is unaware. Think of the 
myriad  flows  and  eddies  in  the  air  caused  by  your  movements,  your  breathing.  Think  of  the 
electromagnetic waves in which you are marinading day and night – television and radio signals 
that saturate the volume of space around you. Think of the slow oxidation of metals and the eons-
long slide of tectonic plates, the rising and falling of the air pressure. All of these things are outside 
of your awareness because the kinds of things that you can be aware of have depended on the 
evolutionary  history  of  things  that  affect  the  perennial  values  of  an  organism  with  a  similar 
organisation to yours. Amongst the various things of which it is possible for you to be aware, feel 
the clothes  on your  skin,  examine  the details  of  the  texture  on a  nearby wall,  the  sounds that 
murmur  in  the  background,  what  you  become  conscious  of  depends  on  your  concerns,  your 
interests, your intentions at any given time.
In short, your relationship with the world is always skewed to fit your values as an autonomous 
agent, maintaining yourself in the face of continuous perturbation by your environment. It is a key 
tenet of the enactive approach that if I am to describe your cognition – your sense-making – I must 
give  an  account  not  just  of  what  is  going  on  around  you  (the  information  available  in  your 
environment), but of your perspective, your values, adaptivity and embodiment that enable, drive 
and constrain your interactions with the world.
To sum up this way of thinking we need to define the final concepts which will play a significant 
role  not  just  in  this  general  enactive  model  of  perception,  but  also  in  the  account  of  social 
perception that we will go on to develop in this paper. 
The first is identity, in the enactive approach taken to be that which is maintained by an autonomous 
system. Though the material substrate of an autonomous system may be in constant flux like the 
water in a waterfall, the organisation is continuous. What is more, the system, because of its self-
producing character, implicitly and intrinsically distinguishes between itself and its environment, 
thus  producing  and  maintaining  an  identity.  This  is  what  the  enactive  literature  refers  to  as 
producing and defining an identity as a unity within the domain in which it exists.
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Identity is this defining and self-distinguishing aspect of an autonomous system and is thus the basis 
for the values of that system.
The related and in many ways complementary concept of perspective is the relationship that holds 
between an identity and its environment. That perspective is relational is vital to understanding the 
concept. Though it is “owned” by the agent whose values drive it, it can only be fully described or 
explained when both the agent, its environment and their interaction are included in the discussion.
Perspectives are given their character by the values and the embodiment of the agent (its adaptive 
capacities and various sensitivities) and create meaning by imbuing raw, embodied sensitivity with 
implication for those values.
Ultimately, then, for the enactive approach, the mind is a process of sense-making by an identity in 
perspectival interaction with its environment. 
Enactive perception and skilled activity
The enactive approach to understanding the mind means that cognition is never conceived of as a 
series of progressive steps beginning when the sensory surfaces are stimulated and culminating in 
the triggering of peripheral muscle movements. Perception is a facet of sense-making rather than a 
distinct  “input”  phase.  It  must  be  understood  within  the  context  of  valued,  skilful  activity. 
Perception is not structured by the character of bodily sensitivities alone (the light-sensitive retinae, 
the pressure-sensitive skin) but also by the skills that the agent is enacting, deploying at a given 
time. It is in the conception of perception that the dynamic sensorimotor approach of O'Regan & 
Noë (2001, and also Noë, 2004) and the enactive approach most closely align. O'Regan & Noë 
(2001) argue that vision is the deployment  of certain sensorimotor skills,  the conduct of action 
coordinated by a person's knowledge of the relevant contingencies of the situation.
Enactive theorists typically endorse much of this embodied, skill-based account (see, for example, 
Thompson 2007, pp. 254-256) but it is important to add that an enactive approach highlights the 
fact  that  the  agent's  values  and  autonomy are  structuring  behaviour  at  all  times.  The  skills  in 
question are not, and never should be, considered abstractly.  They develop in the service of the 
embodied agent enacting its values, maintaining itself.
The concept  of  skill,  despite  its  vital  importance  and load-bearing position within the enactive 
conceptual framework has largely gone unanalysed within the literature.2 A full development of the 
idea is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, some preliminary comments are in order.
2 The principal analysis of the concept of skill in the literature is a debate over the use of the distinction between 
“knowing that” and “knowing how” used by O'Regan & Noë (2001). This distinction appears to have produced 
more heat than light on the matter, however, and its use has been questioned by several authors (e.g. Hutto, 2005; 
Rowlands, 2007). The particular form of the distinction has also been a source of confusion and criticism for Noë's 
(2005) dynamic sensorimotor account.
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In  discussing  the  (rather  elusive)  distinction  between  intellectual  and  performative  skills, 
psychologists Rosenbaum, Carlson & Gilmore (2001, p.454) define skill as “an ability that allows a 
goal to be achieved within some domain with increasing likelihood as a result of practice.” That 
skills arise through a process of adaptively engaging with the world (through practice) is perfectly 
consonant with the concept of cognition as an adaptive process of making sense of the world, but it 
is  the  highlighting  of  the  goal-driven  character  of  skills  that  is  of  interest  to  us  here.  It  is  an 
appreciation of this point that distinguishes the dynamic sensorimotor view from the enactive. Skills 
arise and are deployed in the service of the agent's goals, their values. For the enactivists these are 
not goals somehow represented by the system, but rather instantiated in the very organisation of the 
system – an adaptive organisation that will grow more complex over time. The result is that every 
action and perception is infused with values of the agent to its very core, meaning is not added to 
abstract  information  or  neutral  sensation  at  some  stage  in  an  assembly  line  of  progressive 
processing. What the world implies for the acting agent is not inferred through some process of 
logic applied to passively received signals from the environment. Meaning emerges from the agent's 
sense-making, a product of autonomy, adaptivity and perspective.
The autonomy and adaptively developed skills of the agent are thus basic to the enactive analysis of 
cognition. Sensations and sensorimotor contingencies offer us little by themselves (something noted 
by  O'Regan  & Noë,  2001  who  require  a  mastery  of  sensorimotor  contingecies),  but  with  the 
regularity and structure they give, when contextualised within the complementary structure of the 
agent's valued actions, we get perception, cognition and action. We are never simply “observers”, 
never letting the visual world wash over us, but in the case of vision, for example, we are visually 
guided walkers, or chess-players, or art critics. The skills structuring the actions of the agent play 
equal part in their perceptions with the sensory aspects.
For O'Regan & Noë, vision involves a “mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingency”, for Noë 
(2004),  a  mastery  of  the  knowledge  of  sensorimotor  regularities.  Rosenbaum  et  al.'s  (2001) 
definition  of  skill  reminds  us  that  skills  are  domain-specific,  practised  and goal-directed.  What 
characterises the domain of a skill is precisely the laws of contingency that apply within it – the 
collection of consequences that await given actions which can, given experience and adaptivity, be 
incorporated into the agent's processes of self-maintenance. In short, skills are characterised by the 
specific contingencies that are involved in the interaction between an agent and its environment.
The perspective of the agent is formed at any time in part by the skills that adaptive agent has 
developed over its existence, skills which structure the very activity of perception (enaction) itself, 
not something that enriches otherwise passive reception of sensory information. There is no such 
thing as neutral or objective perception, only valued and perspectival interaction, structured by the 
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goals of the agent and the contingencies contextualised within those valued actions.
It is our contention in this paper that social interaction, and sociality generally, while being unique 
as a domain of activity due to the presence of other dynamic and adaptive agents, follows precisely 
this value-laden contingency-structured form. The present paper is an explication of that idea and its 
consequences for understanding enactive agents and the nature of social cognition.
Social perception: participating in intersubjective contingencies 
People can interindividually coordinate. Coordination is “the non-accidental correlation between the 
behaviours of two or more systems that are in sustained coupling, or have been coupled in the past, 
or have been coupled to another, third, system” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, p. 490). People can 
coordinate movements (Schmidt and O’Brien 1997), including utterances and eye contact (Bavelas 
et al. 2002), and even heart rate (Neugebauer and Aldridge 1998). Previously, such coordinations 
have  been  described  in  connection  with  for  instance  affect  regulation  in  infancy  (e.g.  Stern 
1985/1998) or the constitution and use of interaction space (Scheflen and Ashcraft 1976, Kendon 
1990).  These  findings  about  coordination  have  the  potential  to  stretch  psychology’s  generally 
individualist  and  cognitivist  imaginations  of  social  cognition.  If  enactionists  are  interested  in 
explaining cognition by closely examining the interactions between agents and their environment, 
social enactionists are fascinated by the role of coordination and interaction in intersubjectivity. 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo have proposed a definition of social interaction on the basis of which they 
work out an account of intersubjectivity. They suggest that the following two elements make up a 
social  interaction:  1)  the  autonomy of  the  participants,  and  2)  the  autonomy of  the  interaction 
process. According to their definition, “social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least 
two  autonomous  agents,  where  the  regulation  [concerns]  aspects  of  the  coupling  itself  [and] 
constitutes an emergent  autonomous organization in the domain of relational  dynamics,  without 
destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be 
augmented or reduced)” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, p. 493). 
In order to see how this definition of social interaction expands into an account of how people can 
make-sense together and of each other, we need to further examine the concepts of autonomy and 
sense-making.  We have described autonomy above as the organisation that characterizes a self-
producing system. A social interaction can also self-organise during for parts its unfolding and thus 
constitute a – temporary – self-producing system. This may happen because a set of sub-processes 
self-organises  and  thus  maintains  an  overall  self-organisation.  Such  sub-processes  can  include 
coordinations between movements and utterances of the participants (e.g. in eye contact, gesture 
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mirroring or intonation entrainment). Thus, interactors may coordinate at the level of their gazes, 
gestures,  prosody,  and  so  on.  This  kind  of  coordination  can  be  described  as  interactional  
coordination,  where  two  systems  are  “in  sustained  coupling”  (see  the  definition  above).  Such 
interactionally generated coordination, or co-regulated coordination, can happen at several leves, 
ranging from the entrainmnet of tiny aspects of te participants’ movements, to the coordination of 
intentions. If such coordination self-organises, we can say that, during the period in which this is the 
case, the interaction is autonomous. 
Like in the definition of autonomy given above, an interaction often maintains this organisation in 
the  face  of  perturbations.  In  the  social  domain,  this  happens  for  instance  when the  interaction 
overrides individual participants’ intentions. This is illustrated by situations in which you end up 
interacting  even if  none of you  was planning to,  or  you are  unable  to stop interacting  even if 
everyone would like to. When participants are not interested in interaction and would rather carry 
on with other  business or  they would like  to  end an interaction  and actively attempt  this,  this 
constitutes a precarious situation for the interaction. When they are nevertheless not able to avoid or 
end the interaction, the interaction as a process exhibits resilience in the face of these perturbations. 
Of course, it is generally possible for either of the interactors to undertake something that will break 
the autonomous coordination. For instance, in the case where two people meet on a narrow road and 
end up in front of each other, mirroring each other’s steps for a while, when what they each initially 
intended to do was to just walk past each other, one of them can say “after you”. This breaks the 
unintended coordination and each can return on their individual path.  
An interaction process does not have to be continually autonomous. It can take on a ‘life of its own’ 
at some point during its course, but does not have to remain so all the time. Social interactions 
fluctuate between highly organised (low-dimensional) and less organised (high-dimensional) states, 
being sometimes autonomous,  sometimes determined by the participants.  These fluctuations  are 
bound to happen in a process that emerges between already autonomous systems. It is precisely this 
complex interplay between the different autonomies at play – those of the individuals and that of the 
interaction  process  –  that  is  central  to  the  different  manifestations  of  intersubjectivity 
(understanding  each other,  negotiation,  fighting,  love,  group dynamics,  trust,  amae,  aggression, 
responsibility,  making  and  transforming  meaning  together,  tact,  language,  perspective-taking, 
misunderstandings, and so on). 
De  Jaegher  and  Di  Paolo’s  argument  about  how  interpersonal  understanding  works  is 
straightforward.  They  propose  that  if  people  can  coordinate  with  each  other  through  and  in 
movement,  and their animate movement  forms an essential  ingredient  of sense-making (Sheets-
Johnstone 1999),  then people can participate  in each other’s  sense-making.  This happens when 
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coordination  structures  in  the  interaction  affect  individual  sense-making  and  co-regulations  of 
intentions,  areas  of  concern,  affect,  and  so  on  occur.  De  Jaegher  and  Di  Paolo  propose  that 
participatory sense-making opens up a new range of sense-making for each individual,  and can 
allow each to do things they could not do outside of this particular interaction (2007). The fact that 
the interaction process can take on a certain autonomy implies that responsibility for what happens 
may not always be easily attributable to either one of the interactors. 
Social perception and social skill
Something still lacking in the participatory sense-making story is an account of social skill. We 
believe that this issue is closely related to the question of what social perception is – our main 
concern in this paper. Why? According to the sensorimotor approach to perceptual consciousness 
perception  is  action  and action  is  perception.  This  extends  to  social  perception,  which  can  be 
equally conceived as action in the interpersonal domain. If perception is the skilful engagement 
with the physical world, social perception is the skilful handling of social situations. In this paper, 
we propose that social perception is the capacity to participate in social or self-other contingencies. 
In order to characterize our understanding of these social contingencies, we first turn to research on 
social interaction in infancy, what is referred to in the literature as "primary intersubjectivity", and 
which Gallagher (2001) has argued forms the basis for social interaction throughout life. Reddy et 
al.  (1997)  describe  primary  intersubjectivity  as  the  mutual  regulation  of  affect  and  attention. 
Children, on this view, are not idle recipients of parental activity but are themselves engaged in that 
activity.  M.C.  Bateson  describes  children  as  collaborating  in  patterns  of  'protoconversation' 
(Bateson, 1979), exchanges of motion and vocalisation that serve the mutual regulation. To this end 
the subtle timings of the interaction are noted and important for both the infant and the adult. Lynne 
Murray  (Murray  & Trevarthen,  1985)  showed that  no  matter  how positive  and  expressive  the 
mother's behaviour to her infant child, if that behaviour is not modulated to account for the child's 
own activity (as, for instance, if it is recorded and shown to the child on video) the child shows 
signs of agitation and distress (such signs are not shown even if the mother is interacting through a 
video-link, so long as actual timings of responses and eye contact are not distorted). Murray & 
Trevarthen  (1986)  showed  that  the  mother  is  equally  sensitive  to  such  distortions  of  the 
communication channel. This removes support for the idea that truly mutual interaction between 
infant and adult is an illusion arising out of the adult's attributions of communicative intent to the 
child.  Trevarthen  concludes  that  “...normal,  happy,  protoconversational  games  need  immediate 
sympathetic contact” (1998, p. 34). 
Infant intersubjectivity is essentially a primary empathy, an emotional foundation to communication 
and personal interaction. Emotions are not just about state- or self-regulation (Trevarthen, 1998). 
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Infants do not just emote when hungry, tired or in pain. Their emotions also regulate their interac-
tions with others, interactions that are not just responses to but intentional engagements with anoth-
er agent. The contingencies of social interaction are thus largely emotional or affective in nature. 
Action and perception in the social domain are a matter of coordinating the behaviours, emotions 
and intentions  of the agents involved, in and through the coordination of movement (including 
utterances). Social skill then is the mastery of these social contingencies. Being able to structure our 
actions based on how our own and others’ emotions change and affect them, and the complement-
ary knowledge of emotional dynamics in other people is a very significant part of social skills and 
the social domain of activity. 
This  emphasis  on  the  emotional  character  of  social  action  highlights  that  social  perception  is 
different from ordinary physical perception in  three important ways. Firstly, in the social domain 
you are not perceiving a ‘what’ but a ‘who’ – a subject, not an object. Secondly, this ‘who’ that you 
are perceiving is herself a perceiver, and moreover a perceiver of you. She participates in the very 
same interaction in which you perceive her. Thirdly, the contingencies of social interaction seem to 
be less closely tied to the fine details of embodiment than is the case in physical perception. This 
flexibility in social contingencies makes them amenable to be negotiated between participants in the 
interaction itself. Let us take each of these differences in turn. 
The first difference is that in a social interaction, you are interacting with another subject. (At least, 
this is the case as long as the interaction satisfies the first criterion of De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s 
definition, namely that each interactor maintains his autonomy. As soon as one of them loses it, the 
interaction stops being a social one and you might as well be interacting with an object or tool.) 
Moreover – and this is the second difference – a person can, by his actions, change you too. Of 
course this happens with objects as well. If a beam falls on your head, you will not be the same 
afterwards. But the beam does not intend to change or influence you, whereas a person often does. 
In interacting with persons, we are interacting in the first place with their intentions, not just with 
their physical properties. In fact, social interactions are hardly ever merely physical (actually, this is 
also the case in  ‘physical’  perception,  as  perception  is  always  value-laden,  but our perception-
actions  with  objects  are  laden  with  mostly  different  kinds  of  values).  The  traditional  account 
surmises that  it  is  our ‘cold’ perception of the human figure’s physical  features  that,  when put 
through the right finely tuned mechanism, leads us to understanding the thoughts, feelings, desires 
and beliefs hidden inside them. On the basis of the perceived drops of water on a friend’s cheeks, 
the downcurled corners of his mouth, the dullness in his eyes, we deduce that he is crying. But on 
the  approach we are  investigating  here,  we immediately  engage  with  a  person’s  emotions  and 
intentions and through this engagement understand, perceive and influence them. Contingencies of 
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action  are  not  simply  sensorimotor,   but  social  and  personal.  We  refer  to  them  as  self-other 
contingencies. 
Finally, the presence of two intentional subjects in social interaction gives the entire situation an 
even  more  dynamic  character  than  coupling  with  the  physical  world.  Certainly,  sensorimotor 
contingencies are at play in interactions between people. After all, you interact with them through 
your  sensorimotor  apparatus.  Indeed,  people  interpersonally  coordinate  their  movements, 
utterances,  and so on, and this  is a sensorimotor  interaction.  But whereas our interactions  with 
objects rest on fixed regularities, interactions with other agents can be far less predictable. When 
you move your eyes around an object in a certain way, you may be able to tell whether it is a bar or 
a cube. When you move your eyes around a person, you may be able to tell whether they are a man 
or a woman, but you may also dramatically change your social relationship with that person. And 
the  way  they  move  their  eyes  around  you  will  equally  transform  the  relationship.  These 
transformations are dynamic and negotiable. For instance, the very same eye movements over the 
very same body, done when the two first meet, might destroy their relationship before it begins. But 
done later on in an interaction, it might add fuel to an already lighting fire. 
Asking someone their name in a bar, for example, is not a mere request for information but a social 
action which begins a subtle dance coordinating not the bodily movements or available information, 
but the relationship between the people involved – their identities, their selves. Transforming that 
relationship is done in a participative, shared process structured by the people's values, their own 
perspective on the situation. Our perceptions of other people, apart from being imbued with our 
values as seen in the discussion of perception in general, are structured by the activities in which we 
might both participate – flirting, bargaining, commanding, theory building, hanging out – and may 
change over the course of the ongoing unfolding of these activities. 
It  is  important  to  also  stress  another  way in  which  participation  in  self-other  contingencies  is 
different from interacting in the non-social domain. Even though interactions with others can be 
very  flexible,  they  can  also  be  extremely  rigid.  This  may happen  for  instance  in  relationships 
between people,  i.e.  in pairs  or groups who have a certain  history of interaction.  For example, 
Granic has investigated how the relationship between parents and their  teenage children can be 
stuck in a pattern of hostile interactions, even if all parties want to stop this kind of interaction. She 
suggests  that  interactions  and their  development  (and  the  development  of  the  participants)  are 
interdependent and that real-time interactions between infant and parent are a system that is not 
reducible to its constituent parts (Granic 2000).
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Enacting social skills
So what  is  a social  skill  on this  account?  Social  skill  is  not a purely individual  feature.  At an 
individual level, social skill can be described as the flexibility to deal with the regularities, but also 
the irregularities and surprises of the social domain, provided by the actions of others, who may 
each be very different from one another. This flexibility, though in part individually determined, is 
also determined by the process of interaction. 
In  order  to  illustrate  this,  let  us  take  a  look  at  the well-known  literature  in  developmental 
psychology on the detection of social contingencies (Gergely and Watson 1996, Nadel et al. 1999). 
Gergely and Watson hypothesise that “human infants are sensitive to the existence of contingencies 
between their behavior and environmental events” (Gergely & Watson 1999, p. 101). This is why 
they developed the idea of a module that can detect such contingencies. The assumption here is that 
contingencies are features of certain stimuli, and therefore out there to be detected and perceived. 
Objects  in  the  infant’s  world  either  react  to  his  motions  with  a  high  contingency  (moving 
immediately after a movement of the infant, for instance an object that is kicked by the infant), or 
with a lower contingency (moving at a slight delay, as does another person). 
We want to make clear in what way our approach differs from this. If the contingencies in Watson 
and Gergely’s view, as features of certain stimuli, are out there, the question to be asked is: Where 
do they come from? On the enactive, interactive account of perception, it is more accurate to say 
that contingencies are not features of an object, but characterize an individual’s interaction with a 
certain  stimulus.  As  such,  social  contingencies  are  in  the  first  place  processes  that  individuals 
themselves participate in and construct. Social contingencies are features of social interactions, not 
of objects perceived from a distance in order to then help categorise the object, e.g. as living, social 
or static. This idea is also illustrated in Murray and Trevarthen’s research, already mentioned above, 
which extended the still face experiment and, in our view, shows that as soon as interactors cannot 
participate  anymore,  but  are  faced  with  for  instance  a  recording  of  their  partner’s  previous 
behaviour, it is not possible to mutually engage anymore. Infants can indeed distinguish between 
contingent and non-contingent stimuli but they do this through their behaviour rather than through 
the use of a dedicated cognitive module.
Intersubjective contingencies
De Jaegher & Di Paolo's (2007) enactive account of sociality removes a double screen of inferences 
from between the agents in a social  encounter.  Agents do not  interact  by proxy – transmitting 
information out into the world through facial expressions, vocal utterances and bodily movement in 
the hope that the others will be able to put the pieces together and understand them, while struggling 
with the same jigsaw from them. Values and actions become coordinated,  or fail to, in a direct 
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manner, as agents participate in the cooperative (or competitive) production of meaning. Note that 
this also entails a different assumption about intentions from the traditional view. On our account, 
intentions are not hidden away and static, needing to be carried from head to head. Instead, we 
conceive of intentions as accessible and susceptible to change through embodied interaction. 
Participative sense making in essence creates a new domain of interaction between an agent and 
their environment, a social domain whose landscape is negotiated, continually evolving at a rate 
dramatically  higher  than  the  “merely”  physical  environment.  Nevertheless,  physical  and  social 
perception  remain  very  similar  in  form.  Value-driven  agents  are  perspectivally  engaged  and 
perception, action and cognition are structured by the affect-laden self-other contingencies present 
in (in fact, created in) the interaction. 
A subject is not fully constituted outside of the interaction, independently of it. A subject, instead, is 
partly constituted in and through the interaction. A subject in interaction, a participant, also does not 
fully constitute the interaction. The other has to cooperate, and so, in a sense, does the interaction 
process. Social skills involve in part acting through socially constructed norms and practices. In 
deploying  such  skills  we  effectively  produce  contingencies  between  ourselves  and  others  and 
explore the social landscape through a mastery of them. Particular interactions will be a product of 
the perspectives of both interacting agents, their values and the particulars of the social practices 
through which they are engaging with each other. The commitment of both (or more) parties to 
those  social  practices  provides  a  certain  stability  to  the  interaction,  but  also  ensures  that  our 
autonomy is transformed, structured or limited. 
Social skill itself is not only a mastery of the contingencies extant in social norms and practices, 
therefore, but also a mastery of negotiation. Such existing practices are coordinated in interaction 
with other agents rather than simply acted out without sensitivity to the actions of the other. Social 
skills  involve  a  mastery  of  mutual  coordination,  not  just  a  mastery  of  social  sensorimotor 
contingencies.  The  contingencies  in  any  given  interaction  will  not  just  be  a  set  of  “standard” 
sensorimotor  ones  governed  by  social  norms,  but  contingencies  which  arise  and  transform 
dynamically due to the values and skills of the other person with whom we are interacting. We do 
not simply perceive and act on, but socially interact with other people.
The  social  therefore  has  much  to  tell  us  about  the  nature  of  the  individual,  and  the  enactive 
approach, which makes much of the continuities of mind (from life to cognition, from self to other), 
has another continuity to offer – from individual to society.
Social Contingencies, Cultural Psychology and The Self as Perspective
An agent's perspective is given structure by the skills it deploys. Skills are the means by which the 
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agent  achieves  its  goals  in  a  given  situation,  by  meshing  its  own  behaviour  with  the  set  of 
contingencies in that situation. The contingencies of social interaction are partially negotiated in 
each interaction  because they depend on the interacting agents'  own behaviour,  their  emotional 
responses,  their  intentions  and goals  on  that  specific  occasion.  The  social  domain  is  therefore 
challenging in a way that physical activities are not. These negotiations, however, are never begun 
from scratch.  Some contingencies  in  social  interactions  are  standardised,  settled  during  a  long 
proccess  of  enculturation.  The  culture  we  inhabit  provides  social  practices,  rituals,  grammars, 
narrative tropes and social mores into which a person is inducted in the course of their development. 
An enactive approach to social interaction will need to acknowledge and analyse the various social 
means by which people negotiate and participate within shared meanings. Thankfully, though, this 
enterprise  has already been on-going in  cultural  psychology (see Bruner,  1990;  Benson, 2001). 
Jerome Bruner (1990) describes cultural psychology as a project to understand how human beings 
make  meaning  (he  contrasts  it  with  computationalism,  an  attempt  to  understand  information 
processing).  In  this,  the  approach  shares  much  with  the  enactive  perspective,  and  with  social 
enaction in particular.
Cultural psychology has extensive studies of the ways in which societies and communities develop 
and sustain narrative practices, standard genres and stories which help structure social interaction 
and the management of our places in various cultural or societal networks (see for example Harré's 
examination of personhood (1997); Nelson's studies of language and narrative skills in development 
(1996); Bruner's discussion of the way in which narrative is used by a family group to negotiate 
shared meaning, and in particular emotional responses (1990)). It incorporates social constructionist 
and  developmental  approaches  to  psychology  and  provides  us  with  studies  on  the  potency  of 
narrative, grammar and collective practices in joining with and participating in shared meanings. 
Acknowledging this  work means that a social  enactive approach is not developing into a void. 
Rather, social enaction provides an over-arching framework that makes clear not only how cultural 
psychology might relate to biology and autonomous systems, but how the two are continuous with 
one another. Culture is not stapled on to autonomy and agency, but is intrinsic to their development 
and operation. The approach gives to the mind sciences a coherence that is both scientifically and 
humanistically  satisfying.  The  relationship  between  the  various  facets  of  subjects  as  biological 
entities,  meaningful  cognisers  and  socially  engaged,  culturally  embedded  agents  can  be 
acknowledged and accounted for without being crassly reduced, eliminated or ignored.
Work within  the  domain  of  cultural  psychology,  then,  can  aid  us  in  explicating  the  form and 
function of social contingencies and the dynamics of social interaction. For the enactive approach, 
mastery of these social contingencies involves developing and deploying skills that help achieve, 
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maintain and transform the identity of an agent in social contexts.
In the enactive literature an autonomous system is often described as instantiating a “minimal self”. 
The fact  that  this  self  exists  is  what  grants  the interactions  between the  system and the world 
meaning. The self is the principle of coherence of the cognitive process. As noted in the discussion 
of autonomy and adaptivity above, however, identity alone is the basis for intrinsic value, but is not 
sufficient for the kind of rich forms of meaningfulness that we might understand as cognition. Di 
Paolo's (2005) arguments suggest that identity is necessary but not sufficient for cognition. We wish 
to draw a distinction, based on Di Paolo's logic, between identity on the one hand and self on the 
other. While identity is the basis for value and meaning, the self is the coherence of values and 
skills of an adaptive organism that constitutes its perspective, the meaningful relationship between 
the organism and the world.
While identity provides the foundation for intrinsic value for the fundamental basis of a self, it is in 
the richness of the skilled, adaptive self that we encounter agency and cognition. In the case of 
physical  perception,  such  as  navigating  the  physical  world,  we are  physical  selves,  embodied, 
dynamic, fleshy, hungry. In the case of social interaction, where we recognise and coordinate with 
other cognitive agents, we are social selves, personal selves – that is, we are people. The enactive 
approach shares with cultural psychology a fluid, dynamic conception of selfhood that depends on 
goals, intentions and other people. The self that we discuss in more generic contexts – the idea of 
“who we are” – is precisely that set of skills that enables us to engage with, negotiate with, interact 
with, other people. In Western culture those engagements have been standardised around the idea of 
a unitary and consistent centre (sometimes explicitly labelled a “true self”). What matters, though, 
is  that  the idea  is  consistent  enough to  enable  perception,  cognition  and action  within a  given 
interaction. The personal self, in such a view, is an affective, lived, bodily set of skills we deploy to 
successfully participate in shared meaning in our culture.
From this point of view, the mutual regulation of affect in primary intersubjectivity is similar to an 
apprenticeship  through  which  a  child  learns  the  structure  of  normal  social  interaction  in  their 
community. Through forming, learning to maintain and to act within social interactions with others, 
the infant develops the kinds of skills that they will need to participate fully, to make meaning as a 
member of their cultural or social group. Amongst other things, this means that the child develops a 
personal self.
The contrasts between the enactive approach to social contingencies and that of Gergely & Watson 
(1999) have already been noted. The emphasis on the dynamic and continually negotiated character 
of social contingencies in the present paper would appear at odds with the kind of standard or stable 
forms of contingency that are formed in a child's infantile apprenticeship of social interaction. This 
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conflict  is  only  apparent,  however.  While  standard  modes  of  action  and  forms  of  activity  are 
certainly extant within a culture, they are never simply acted out, rigidly adhered to within a given 
social  interaction,  but  modulated  and  customised,  as  it  were,  to  fit  the  details  of  the  current 
interaction. The child never experiences a fixed set of social contingencies, but is rather inducted 
into the ranks of skilled, fluid interactors.
Bodies in social interaction
Not  even  this  initial  apprenticeship  is  entered  into  ab  initio by  the  child,  however.  It  is  a 
fundamental tenet of the enactive approach that all cognition is embodied, and that while bodies 
may constrain behaviour to some extent, they also structure activity and afford certain actions – and 
interactions. Primary intersubjectivity is embodied at its core, a delicate and intricate dance of lived 
bodily, facial and eye movements coordinating the actions of infant and adult.
We are physically present in the domain of interaction. Our lived bodies, in gross form and fine 
detail, are fundamental to the interaction – am I a man or a woman, adult or child? Where are my 
eyes looking? What are my hands and arms doing? How is my body oriented? These details, basic 
and subtle, express my lived-bodyness and pervade my social interactions.
My embodiment is an important part of my social self, but the physical aspects of the social domain 
are not all there is to it. The domain we explore as social beings is principally affective in character. 
The skills we deploy in these interactions are secondarily sensorimotor, contextualised as they are 
in social and cultural practices. Culture transforms our body from a physical mode of cognition, 
action, perception, to a social one, where action can be shared, values coordinated. It is a dramatic 
alchemy that occurs through participatory sense-making and the acknowledgement of the agency of 
another. The implications of this fact for the enactive approach cannot be over-stressed. 
The  enactive  approach  was  inaugurated  in  the  appreciation  of  the  embodied  mind  (Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch, 1991). It is closely associated with an appreciation for the biological basis of 
meaning and value (see the significant literature on autopoiesis, taking perhaps Maturana & Varela, 
1987, Weber & Varela, 2002 and Di Paolo 2005 as points of departure). Its greatest impact on the 
mainstream of cognitive science has been through its influence on and support of research on the 
sensorimotor basis of perception (e.g. O'Regan & Noë's examination of vision (2001), drawn upon 
by Thompson (2007) in his enactive account of perception, and Noë's slightly amended approach, 
which he terms “enactive”, but which we have referred to here as dynamic sensorimotor (2004)). 
Despite this deep commitment to the essential  inclusion of bodily facts in our understanding of 
meaning  and  experience,  the  approach's  deepest  loyalties  are  to  meaning  and  experience 
themselves. It is not the simple fact of its physicality and the constraints it imposes on cognitive 
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activity that makes the body important, but that it instantiates and adaptively maintains the values of 
the organism. The body provides a basis for the agent's perspective, but that perspective cannot be 
reduced to biology (Di Paolo, 2009, see also Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). The agent's motivated, 
lived, skilful actions are our focus, constituting his perspective. Though behaviour can always be 
given a biological description, the actions of the agent occur in the domain in which the agent is 
skilfully  engaged.  In  the  case  of  social  interaction,  that  is  the  social  domain  –  related  to  but 
ultimately quite distinguishable from the physical. 
Conclusion
The account of the social advanced in this paper highlights some aspects of enactivism that have 
recently come under scrutiny, in particular the relationship between embodiment and cognition, and 
contextualises those considerations within the social domain. Further, new avenues of research have 
been opened through the development of the concept of social contingency and the consonance of 
this enactive conception with the approach to understanding meaning making already extant in the 
cultural psychology literature.
Social enaction offers the enactive approach a clearer view of the self as the principle of coherence 
of skilled activity by the agent. This view holds the self as central to cognition, while allowing us to 
appreciate the manner in which it is partially constituted in and through the interaction itself. There 
will undoubtedly be a range of implications for our understanding of transformations or pathologies 
of self that have had to remain beyond the scope of the present paper. Our account, for instance, 
makes the idea that autism as a kind of “mind blindness” ever more literal, given the manner in 
which  social  understanding  is  actually  perception  (rather  than  inference  to  sociality  based  on 
perception). There may also be interesting implications for phenomena such as Capgras syndrome, 
a disorder in which a person holds a delusional belief that a friend, spouse or other close family 
member,  has  been  replaced  by  an  identical-looking  impostor.  Matthew  Ratcliffe  has  recently 
described it as a transformation of the relationship between a person and their loved ones, being 
simultaneously social, affective and perceptual in character (2008). This kind of approach to the 
syndrome would fit well with the way we have characterised social perception as social skill here. 
Important  challenges  also  arise  for  enactive  theorists  and  researchers.  The  concept  of  skill  is 
fundamental  to  enactive  theory  and  plays  a  foundational  role  in  the  description  of  the  social 
advanced in this paper. It is still a poorly explicated concept within the enactive literature generally, 
however,  and much work is  yet  to  be done in  teasing  out the various  aspects  of  embodiment, 
adaptivity, goal-directedness and coordination of behaviours that will be needed before we have a 
description of skill with which we can feel satisfied. Further elaboration of this notion must take 
into account the role of sociality, and be amenable to testing in empirical investigations. 
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Ultimately, an enactive understanding of sociality allows us to grasp both what social interaction 
shares with physical interaction and what makes the social unique. The enactive approach makes 
clear how the special character of social interaction arises directly from the same principles that 
structure our understanding of physical  perception from an enactive point of view – autonomy, 
value, adaptivity,  perspective. The approach provides the concepts and framework to support an 
understanding of the social as genuinely social, rather than individual cognition where the content 
of thought happens to include other people.
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